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FREE SPEECH, FAIR TRIALS, AND FACTIONALISM
IN UNION DISCIPLINE*
SEEKING to curb some of the abuses in the internal government of labor
unions which had been uncovered by the McClellan Committee I investigations,
Congress appended Title I, the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organi-
zations,2 to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.3
As introduced on the floor by Senator McClellan, the provisions of that title
guaranteed certain rights of members against infringement by labor organi-
zations; they were specifically amended during debate to insure that unions
would be able to prescribe and apply reasonable rules to protect themselves
against internal subversion of their institutional functions.4 Title I thus estab-
lishes a balance between the interest of members in democratic expression
and the interest of labor unions in institution integrity. Yet it does not specify
how that balance is to be struck; determinations of reasonableness must be
made by the federal courts. Saizhandler v. Caputo 5 was one of the first cases
requiring interpretation of the balance-specifically, the balance within section
101 (a) (2), which guarantees freedom of speech and assembly to union mem-
bers.6
* Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3213
(U.S. Dec. 9, 1963).
The editors of the Journal wish to thank Miss Marguerite Schimpff, L.L.B. Yale,
1963, whose unpublished divisional paper "Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America, AFL-CIO, District Council 9 of New York City: A Case
Study" (on file, Yale Law School Library) has contributed substantially to our under-
standing and to this piece, and Professors Clyde W. Summers and Harry H. Welling-
ton, of the Labor Law Division, who brought her paper to our attention.
1. The Committee on, Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field, a specially
created Senate select committee chaired by Senator McClellan.
2. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. IV, 1963).
3. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 411-15, 431-40, 461-66, 481-83, 501-04,
521-31 (Supp. IV, 1963).
4. 105 CONG. REc. 6475 (1959). There was no Bill of Rights for Union Members in
the Kennedy-Ives Bill of 1958, S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) which passed the
Senate and failed in the House of Representatives. Nor was any such provision included
in the Kennedy-Ervin Bill, S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) as reported out of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
Senator McClellan proposed the section as an amendment to the bill after it reached
the floor of the Senate. 105 CONG. REc. 6475 (1959). That amendment was passed on April
22, 1959; on April 25, the Senate modified the McClellan provision by approving an
amendment thereto proposed by Senator Kuchel, which, among other changes, added the
clause "subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the
conduct of meetings" and the Proviso now found in § 101 (a) (2) of the act. Note 6 infra.
See Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MIxN.
L. REv. 199 (1960).
5. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3213 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1963).
6. Section 101 (a) (2) reads:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMLY. - Every member of any labor organization
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express
SECTION 101(a) (2) RIGHTS
Solomon Salzhandler, as Financial Secretary of Local 442 of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Painters, Paperhangers, and Decorators of North
America, 7 became aware in the summer of 1960 of what he considered to be
financial irregularities within the Local. In the autumn of that year, having
evoked no response to complaints filed with the regular councils of the union,8
Salzhandler composed and distributed within the union a leaflet incorporating
his suspicions and denouncing Isidore Webman, President and Business Agent
of Local 442, on several minor counts, some specific and documented, others
rather vague.9 His language was not always temperate: among other epithets,
he labeled Webman a "petty robber," "most unworthy of any trust," and
described what he thought to be "the cheapest petty act ever."' 0 Webman filed
charges against Salzhandler with District Council No. 9, of which Local 442
was a part, complaining that his conduct violated sections of the Brother-
any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor or-
ganization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's estab-
lished and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings; Provided, That
nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward
the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would
interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
7. All background information on the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers and on the disciplinary proceedings involving Solomon Salzhandler have
been taken from an unpublished divisional paper in the Yale Law School: Schimpff,
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, AFL-CIO, District
Council 9 of New York City: A Case Study (1963) (Yale Law School Library).
8. Salzhandler complained to the General Executive Board of the International with-
out response and claimed to have levied charges against Webman, whom he held respon-
sible for the irregularities within District Council No. 9. The latter formality was denied
by the District Council officers.
9. Brief for Appellant, Appendix, Exhibit "A," Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445
(2d Cir. 1963). The alleged malpractices concerned a group of checks drawn on the
Local's bank account. Two of the checks were supposed to have covered the salaries and
expenses of Webman and the Local's late business agent, Max Schneider, both of whom
were Local 442's delegates to the 1959 International Convention. One check for $800
showed Webman as payee; the other for $375 was written to "cash": both were endorsed
by Webman and his wife. Salzhandler suggested in the pamphlet that Schneider never
received his check. The Business Agent died in the spring of 1960 and Webman was
appointed to fill the unexpired term. Alleged as well in the pamphlet was that the voting
on a proposal to tax each member $2 for a $1,000 donation to Schneider's son was con-
ducted "fraudulently and by deceit." There were also general accusations about tyrannical
administration and slanderous epithets which Salzhandler claimed Webman had applied
to union members.
10. Brief for Appellant, Appendix, Exhibit "A." Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d
445 (2d Cir. 1963). The pamphlet continues: "Two widows were.refunded each $6 for
overpayment of dues. Two checks were issued to that effect. The petty robber had two
friends sign their names and the chairman declared these two checks as contributions to
the special tax for Michael Schneider. Photostats of checks enclosed." Ibid.
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hood's constitution prohibiting defamation,'1 acts unbecoming an officer,12 acts
detrimental to the union,' 3 and acts inconsistent with the responsibilities of a
member.' 4 A trial board, appointed by Council President Caputo from among
the members of District Council No. 9,15 found Salzhandler guilty as charged
and suspended him from union activities for five years. After a series of
raucous events,16 Salzhandler filed suit against Caputo in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York under sections 102 '" and 609 1s of
the LMRDA, asking nullification of the disciplinary proceedings, reinstate-
ment to his local office, and damages. His suit was dismissed on its merits in
March, 1962.19 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and
11. Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper-
hangers of North America § 267(10).
12. Id. § 267(5).
13. Id. § 267 (6).
14. Id. § 267(16).
15. Salzhandler argued that the trial board was biased against him because Webman
and Caputo were supporters of Rarback, whom Salzhandler opposed, and were anxious
to silence the latter during an election year. One of the Trial Board members, Jack
Breen, was also alleged to be a political and personal enemy of Salzhandler. He also
complained that the composition of the union trial board that heard his case did not
comply with the union constitution. The constitution of the International Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of North America, § 629(b), establishes
that the trial board shall consist of the executive board of the district council; id., § 220
(c) provides that the executive board shall be composed of the chief officers of the
district council. None of the District Council No. 9 officers sat on Salzhandler's Trial
Board, as District Council President Caputo had exercised his discretion under District
Council No. 9 By-Laws, Article XIII § 9 which allows him to appoint substitutes for
any district officers who might be interested parties in the case before the trial board.
16. These events included Salzhandler's attempt to remain in office as Financial
Secretary of Local 442, criminal charges brought by the other officers to compel him to
turn over the Local's books, a fist-fight at the meeting for nomination of officers, and a
resultant suit by a Salzhandler supporter against Webman for assault and battery. See
Schimpff, supra note 7, at 9.
17. Section 102 provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been in-
fringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of
the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court
of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where
the principal office of such labor organization is located.
73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. IV, 1963).
18. Section 609 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop
steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof
to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act. The provisions
of section 102 [29 U.S.C. § 412] shall be applicable in the enforcement of this
section.
73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV, 1963).
19. Salzhandler v. Caputo, opinion not reported (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The opinion ap-
pears in Defendants' Petition for Certiorari, p. 31, Caputo v. Salzhandler, No. 282, Oct.
term 1963.
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granted Salzhandler the requested relief, construing section 101 (a) (2) to pre-
clude discipline for conduct such as his even in the presence of a union rule
prohibiting libel and slander of officers.2 0
That decision seems sound in its result: given the context of Salzhandler's
conduct, his treatment resembled more political suppression than punishment
for defamation. President Webman and Financial Secretary Salzhandler were
familiar and bitter factional combatants: Webman was a supporter of the
incumbent administration; Salzhandler had been associated with an earlier
Communist regime and had since been a vigorous foe of the leadership. 21
And, although defamation had been the gravamen of the union's charges,
Salzhandler's criticism was in no meaningful sense defamatory. However un-
gentlemanly his accusations may appear-at least by most standards of polite
debate-gallantry was not the norm of political opposition within this par-
ticular arena of conflict. Although a strong union when negotiating with em-
ployers, the Painters, and especially District Council No. 9, have writhed with
internal dissension and hostility for the last forty-five years. 22 In the two year
period preceding the Brotherhood's general elections of June, 1961, discontent
was manifested in more than a dozen law suits against the union. Defamation
was often alleged, the complaints suggesting that union meetings bristled with
such epithets as "thieves, scabs, robbers, scabby bosses, bums, pimps, f-bums,
and jail birds."12 3 In such a setting town-meeting standards of fair criticism
can have little application.
The Second Circuit approached the case differently. It found that Salz-
handler's accusations, even if false and defamatory, could not be punished be-
cause they did not come within the terms of the proviso to section 101 (a) (2) ;
his comments had not violated "the responsibility of every member toward
the organization as an institution. . . ."24 Protection of members' individual
rights is paramount, the court reasoned, because the legislative history of the
act made clear that union officials should not be allowed to exercise their dis-
20. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).
21. Since 1950 Salzhandler had also been a regular supporter of litigation against
officers in the Rarback administration; two such cases are Waldmanr v. Ladisky, 101
N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; and Rubinow v. Ladisky, 198 Misc. 225, 97 N.Y.S.2d 526
(Sup. Ct. 1950). See Schimpff, supra note 7, at 7.
22. Gangsters and racketeers exploited the union during the 1920's and 1930's, their
corruption breeding the discontent which opened the Brotherhood to Communist penetra-
tion in the late 1930's and domination during the war. In 1947 a Trotskyite faction under
the direction of Martin Rarback took the leadership out of the grasp of the Communists,
but was not of sufficient strength to prevent the union's being embroiled over the next six
years in an incessant struggle for control. Only by the late 1950's was the Rarback group
the firmly established administration of the Brotherhood, by which time disenchantment
with the leadership was already widespread among the rank and file. See Schimpff, supra
note 7, at 1-4.
23. Brief for Appellant, Appendix, Exihibit "A", Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d
445 (2d Cir. 1963). See Schimpff, supra note 7 passin.
24. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101 (a) (2), 73 Stat.
522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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ciplinary powers "to silence criticism and punish those who dare to question
and complain. ' 25 Especially where financial malpractices may be involved,
Congress sought to encourage hard questioning by the membership. 26 The
court relied upon this broad mandate to protect members' rights because it
found union tribunals inherently incapable of "drawing the fine line between
criticism and defamation" 2 7-- a remark which seems directed more to their
expected partiality than to their technical incompetence-and because it is
impractical for federal courts to give every complaining union member a trial
de novo. Thus the distinctions between criticism and defamation become
"wholly immaterial," 2s because unenforceable, and the attention of the court
is to be fixed upon whether the conduct of the member clearly violates his
responsibility to respect the interests of the union.
Before the passage of the act, state courts did not look to the institutional
interests of the union; in analogizing members' rights to first amendment
protections, they usually found defamation not to be protected speech, and
therefore a valid instance for union discipline.2 9 Even in the debates of Con-
25. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 at 449 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. Id. at 450. The court was probably alluding to section 501 of the Act, Fiduciary
Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations, which, in section 501(b), authorizes
members to sue union officials suspected of violation of their fiduciary obligations if the
other union officials refuse to do so. Members can be reimbursed for expenses incurred
in prosecuting the union's cause against the officer. 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501
(Supp. IV, 1963). See, Comment, Counsel Fees for Union Officers under the Fiduciary
Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE L.J. 443 (1964).
27. 316 F.2d at 450.
28. Id. at 451.
29. Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also
Shapiro v. Gehlman, 152 Misc. 13, 272 N.Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934), rev'd, 244 App.
Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935), aff'd as modified sub norn. Shapiro v. Brennan,
269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935).
The Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), held that the
protection of freedom of speech guaranteed in the first amendment to the Constitution
does not extend to libel.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Id. at 256-57. The analogy of union members' rights to those guaranteed by the first
amendment rests upon the argument, advanced by most labor law commentators, that since
unions, as a form of industrial government derive much of their power from federal statu-
tory protection, they should be limited in their authority to discipline members much as
the Constitution places limitations on civil governments. See Kovner, The Legal Protection
of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 Wis. L. Rzv. 18; Witmer, Civil Liberties and the
Trade Union, 50 YALE L.J. 621 (1941) ; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARv. L. Rnv. 1049, 1072-74 (1951).
For analogies of unions to civil governments, see Summers, Disciplinary Procedures
of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. Rxv. 15, 30 (1950) ; Williams, The Political Liberties of
Labor Union Members, 32 TExAs L. Rxv. 826, 832 (1954) ; also see Taft, Democracy in
Trade Unions, 36 Am. Ecox. REv. (Papers & Proceedings) 359 (1946).
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gress, the analogy to first amendment rights suggested that libel and slander
could be prohibited with reasonable rules." But the act was not written in
such terms. Speech which is libelous does not necessarily have any impact
upon the union. Unless it had such impact, it could not interfere with the
union's legal and contractual obligations or contravene the member's respon-
sibility to the union as an institution, the proviso's grounds for discipline.
Section 101 (a) (2) must therefore be read to bar union rules which prohibit
all defamation of union members and officers: libelous speech which does not
institutionally affect the union is-by the terms of the act-protected. Yet
even when the union is institutionally affected, the proviso requires that the
union rule prohibiting the criticism be "reasonable," no matter how vital the
Nonetheless, courts freely manipulated the analogy, and most other theories, constitu-
tions, and facts to protect the members' right to speak against union suppression, using the
contract theory as an umbrella for protecting speech, Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177
N.E. 833 (1931) ; Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
Courts have traditionally protected speech either by finding procedural defects in the dis-
ciplinary proceedings, Smith v. International Printing Union, 190 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945), or by free construction of union rules, Walsh v. Reardon, 274 Mass. 530, 174
N.E. 912 (1931), and Johnson v. Local 971, Bhd. Carpenters, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170
(1930).
Fitfully, though, a doctrine of "fair criticism" emerged. "Fair criticism is the right of
members of a union, as it is the right of every citizen. A provision of a union constitu-
tion which would suppress protests of members against actions of their officers which such
members regarded as improper or opposed to their best interests, would be illegal and
unenforcible [sic)." Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, at 83, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452, at 455 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). As this right became fixed by judicial recognition, the unions' authority to dis-
cipline for libel and slander was correspondingly circumscribed. Taking cognizance of the
realities of union politics, some courts began to provide protection for substantially true
even though defamatory criticism, Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp.
785 (1935), reversing 152 Misc. 13, 272 N.Y. Supp. 624 (1934), aff'd as modified sub nom.
Shapiro v. Brennan, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935), especially if uttered in the heat
of a bitter political campaign. Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd,
264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1942) (memorandum decision). Union discipline was
sometimes nullified as unduly harsh for a minor indiscretion, such as to suggest that it was
politically motivated punishment. In Reilly v. Hogan, supra, the leader of an opposition
faction charged during a bitter election campaign that the incumbents were using union
funds to aid the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the Spanish Civil War, and was ex-
pelled from the union for slandering officers. In ordering his reinstatement the court took
note of the context of the statement, emphasized that it was a minor charge with little
potential for disruptive impact, and suggested that so harsh a penalty indicated some
political motivation behind the discipline. Moreover, courts have regularly held that dis-
cipline must be in "good faith" if punishment is to be inflicted. Eschman v. Huebner, 226
Ill. App. 537 (1922); Kinane v. Fay, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 Atl. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
30. 105 CONG. REc. 6472, 6478, 10902 (1959) (Remarks of Sen. McClellan); 105
CONG. REc. 6726 (1959) (Remarks of Ser Javits) ; 105 CoNG. REc. 6719 (1959) (Remarks
of Sen. Kuchel).
There is no reason to interpret the congressional analogy so rigidly as to preclude the
reasonable exceptions to protected speech in the union context being quite different from
those in other settings. It was recognized that the impact of certain speech varies with
its audience. 105 CoNG. REc. 15680 (1959) (Remarks of Rep. Celler).
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union function which the rule purports to protect. It is unclear by what stand-
ard of reasonableness union rules are to be measured, the permissive standard
of rationality often used in evaluating state economic regulation or a more
stringent standard of direct relevancy to immediate danger as is generally
considered appropriate to first amendment issues. What is clear is that the
primary purpose of Congress to guarantee members' political rights requires
that, to be reasonable, a rule must always leave available some means for
bringing relevant critical truth to union members.
Some decision-maker is required to make these difficult determinations as
to whether the criticism, true or defamatory, affects the union institutionally,
and whether the rule prohibiting it is reasonable. Two observations within
the Salzhandler opinion indicated how difficult a problem satisfying such a
requirement may be. Union tribunals, the court said, cannot be expected to
be impartial, 1 and in union discipline cases it is impractical for federal courts
to hold trials de novo.32 If these observations are valid, then no disinterested
and competent decision-maker can ever be found to distinguish between pro-
tected and punishable criticism, even when the union is clearly affected. Pre-
sumably, then, a union tribunal would not be sufficiently disinterested to be
allowed to determine whether a member's responsibility to the organization as
an institution had been violated if he had accused a bargaining agent of col-
lusion with management during a period of precarious contract negotiation.
To permit adjudication by such a tribunal might threaten the substantive
rights and protections of section 101 (a) (2). Furthermore, to do so might
constitute a denial of the "fair hearing" guaranteed by section 101 (a) (5).33
Yet a trial de novo in a federal court would still be impractical, and if the
union is to be denied the authority to discipline for such conduct, it is stripped
of its shield against crippling attacks upon its vital functions. For such un-
timely accusations, by undermining the confidence of the membership in its
negotiator, can subvert a collective bargaining effort, perhaps the most basic
function of organized labor. Just as serious might be a racially oriented assault
upon the leadership of a young and struggling union in Mississippi by an
agent of the boss, or widespread publication of a false allegation of Communism
or corruption among union officers in the midst of a prolonged strike. The
ability to undermine, in good faith or in bad, the confidence of members,
employers, and public in a union leader can be the ability to destroy the union
itself as a bargaining agent, as a private enforcer of contracts, and thus as
31. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1963).
32. Ibid.
33. Section 101(a) (5) provides:
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ImPROPER DIscIPLINARY AcTIoN. - No member of any
labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined ex-
cept for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless
such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a
reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (Supp. IV, 1959-1963).
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a participant in the process of industrial democracy.3 4 Discipline has been the
union's traditional means of protection against such internal threats to its
institutional welfare, 35 and Congress opted for its preservation in passing the
proviso to section 101 (a) (2).
The problem of the lack of an appropriate decision-maker when injury to
the union is at issue is not limited to the case of hostile criticism; it pervades
the whole of section 101 (a) (2). A member who incites his fellows to leave
the picket line may damage the union as an institution no less than one who
disrupts collective bargaining. Yet if union tribunals are biased, they are as
incapable of drawing the "thin and tenuous line" between strike-breaking and
a timely call for a return to work as they are to distinguish between political
34. Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. RxEv. 483, 490
(1950). The ILGWU was very nearly destroyed by such tactics; see SEIDMAN, THE
NEEDLE TRADES (1942). Other unions have also suffered paralysis from internal factional-
ism owing to Communist subversion.; see ScHNEIDER, THE WORKERS' (CoMMUIaST)
PARTY IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1927). The same pernicious forms of factionalism
may be used by groups at the other end of the political spectrum, such as the Anti-Com-
munist Association of Catholic Trade Unionists; see LEVENSTEIN, LABOR TODAY AND
Toasoow 163-64 (1945).
35. See Taft, Judicial Procedure in Labor Unions, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 370, 377-81 (1945).
Almost every union has made provision in its constitution protecting itself, its leadership,
and its members from such defamation. An AFL-CIO study made in preparation for the
appeal of the Salkhandler case to the Supreme Court showed 125 of the 152 affiliated in-
ternational unions had clauses in their constitutions which either expressly or by necessary
implication made slander, libel or defaming of an officer a punishable offense. All but 3 of
the 152 had general provisions under which such behavior might be punished. Defendants'
petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7. See also Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions,
3 IND. & LAB. REL.. REv. 483, 498 (1950).
Unions have a heritage of strife, both internal and with other groups, which has
required the kind of constant vigilance to attack and subversion that provokes hyper-
sensitivity to their own security. "It [the union] is primarily a contending and combatitive
organization which needs to be ever ready to engage in battle for vital economic and polit-
ical stakes, often for survival; to marshal all it possesses and more, including its mem-
bers' enthusiasm, loyalty and self interest." Hardman, Comment, in SYMPosIUM ON THE
LAnOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING, AND DISCI.OSURE Act OF 1959 347, 350 (Slovenko, ed.
1960).
For a background on the heritage of strife of the labor movement and expansion of
the war analogy, See Aaron, Unions and Civil Liberties: Claims vs. Performance, 53
Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1958), and Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. &
LAB. REL. Rav. 483, 489 (1950). See also Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,
4 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 15, 30 (1950).
Not only their heritage of strife, but also their tradition of beneficent paternalism
conduces to union leadership's interpreting dissension and criticism, not as expression of
democratic rights, but as a threat to the institution itself. Kovner, The Legal Protection
of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 18, 19. Constitutional provisions,
"reasonable rules," thus can be misapplied to suppress opposition, perverting in that in-
stance the legitimate function of the device. The provision itself, though, is no less valid,
even necessary, as an institutional safeguard against scurrilous attack. It is no less a rea-
sonable rule. Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 483, 512
(1950).
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opposition and an institutional attack. And the Salzhandler caveat that trials
de novo in federal courts are impractical would also apply to this determina-
tion. Are unions therefore to be denied the right to discipline for such con-
duct? And, similarly, would a union be allowed to distinguish between free
assembly and dual unionism, or between peaceful protests and obstructionism?
Yet the unions' need for discipline as a means of self-preservation should not
compel courts to permit biased union tribunals to mete out that discipline in
abrogation of the intended protection of members' rights-including protection
of their right to fair proceedings.
If the balance of members' rights and the institutional welfare of organized
labor inherent within section 101 (a) (2) is to be preserved, then a decision-
maker must be found to investigate with some sophistication the particular
circumstances surrounding the member's conduct-to determine whether his
responsibility to the union was violated and whether the rule under which he
was disciplined was reasonable. The range of relevant variables in any case
of union discipline is enormous. Any examination into context has to take
account of such factors as the nature of the act: was it valid criticism or
malicious slander, intended to improve or disrupt, a serious accusation or a
petty complaint? Equally important is the timing of the conduct: was it an
attack in the midst of a serious challenge to the organization, in a period of
contract negotiation, of a membership drive, during a strike, or was the
opposition manifest during an internal election or at a time of relative in-
stitutional stability? At whom was the charge directed, and who was likely to
be damaged by it, the particular leadership, or the union itself? Obviously
relevant here is the kind of union in which the act took place: was it a be-
leaguered coterie of organizers in Alabama or a firmly entrenched organiza-
tion in Manhattan? The history and reasonable expectations of the members
of the particular union could be relevant: has the government of the union
been responsibly democratic, reasonably autocratic, or cynically dictatorial ?3o
Was the disciplined speech typical of ordinary debate? Certainly an identifica-
tion of the participants or the audience involved would be required: whether
the audience to a scathing attack on the leadership was a meeting of a local
or the general public, or whether the participants in an opposition political
clique were all loyal members or directed and financed by an outside interest,
could be determinative. In some cases the actual impact of the conduct, in
most instances the impact reasonably to be expected, should be weighed.
Seventy years of experience of judicial involvement in internal union dis-
putes strongly suggests that courts are unable to make so detailed an investi-
gation of the relevant context of a member's conduct and to develop standards
of reasonable behavior from that context.3 7 The inquiries inevitably to be made
36. A determination which obviously would not be aimed at prejudicing the outcome,
but only relevant for reconstructing the setting in which the disputed conduct took place.
37. Several approaches to the problem of standards for distinguishing between
protected and punishable conduct within labor unions have been attempted, each requiring
inquiry into the facts of a case in varying degrees of detail. None of them has been con-
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are particular and complex problems of fact; reasoned distinctions necessitate
a specialized understanding of the internal operations of the union involved.
sistently applied, and most have been undermined by the multiplication of exceptions and
qualifications. The courts have manipulated these theories and rules without articulating
their motives, so that their precedential value has been eroded.
Courts intervened originally on a contract theory interpreting union constitutions as
contracts between union and members, defining duties and privileges, the means of securing
them, and the conditions under which they will be lost. Courts adopting this theory
insisted that members be disciplined only for conduct prohibited by, and in conformity
with procedures spelled out in union constitutions, but refused to evaluate the procedure
provided for. For a classic statement see Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 281-82, 177
N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
Courts which have strictly applied the contract theory seem unconcerned that consti-
tutions were "contracts" which could be amended by one party only, in fact, were
"contracts" in which only one party was identified. At their best, they are contracts
of adhesion at their worst. See, Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Repre-
sentation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1346-47 (1958);
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 1049, 1055 (1951);
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175,
180 (1960). Where the custom and practice within a union are quite different from the
procedures set out in the constitution, these courts have required strict adherence to the
latter, see Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, 98 Cal. App. 2d
733, 221 P.2d 136 (1950), even where the procedures complained of were fairer: Rodier
v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931); Simons v. Berry, 240 N.Y.
463, 148 N.E. 636 (1925) ; Tesoriero v. Miller, 74 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
On the other hand, the vagueness of many union constitutions has been naturally
conducive to the kind of judicial interpretation which is in fact the imposition of judicial
standards. "Ambiguous provisions were interpreted to conform to judicial policies, gaps
were filled with judge-made law, and ambiguities or gaps were found in the most clear
and complete clauses." Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MoD.L.
REv. 273, 280 (1962). In time some courts even more directly intervened to excise con-
stitutional provisions as "contrary to public policy," or "contrary to natural justice."
Schneider v. Local 60, United Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905) ; Blek v. Wilson,
145 Misc. 373, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253,
186 N.E. 692 (1933). Thus while ostensibly applying the contract theory, courts some-
times ignore the "contract" or fashion it to their own purposes.
Most state courts require of union proceedings only that there have been substantial
evidence to support the union tribunal's findings of fact. See Pfoh v. Whitney, 43 Ohio
L. Abs. 417, 62 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio App. 1945). "It is not for this court to reexamine the
evidence in order to see whether it would have arrived at the same conclusion as did
the Trial Board." Rosen v. District Council 9, Brotherhood of Painters, 198 F. Supp. 46,
49 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But that standard, too, has been distorted as courts inquired more
searchingly into the real motivations for disciplinary action. Bush v. Internat'l Alliance
of Theatre Stage Employees, 55 Cal. App. 2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942) ; Blek v. Wilson,
145 Misc. 373, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253,
186 N.E.692 (1933). "Close examination of all other cases [than those involving discipline
of Communists] . . . makes clear that the courts normally reweigh the evidence, substi-
tuting their own evaluation of the facts for that of the union tribunal." Summers, The
Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YAIX L.J. 175, 185 (1960).
Frustration with these Janus-like principles finally led the New York courts to conclude
in Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff'd as modified, 4
N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958), that an extensive and careful
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Federal courts lack the time, resources, experience, and expertness to make
such inquiries and draw the necessary distinctions. Moreover, whether or not
federal courts are technically competent to handle these difficult factual issues,
trials de novo would not be in harmony with the congressional option
in favor of minimum intrusion of government into the internal affairs of
unions.s s Emphasis in the act upon union initiative, union rule-making, and
union self-government belies any solution which would leave federal courts as
the only forum for valid disciplinary proceedings, even in so sensitive an area
as political rights of members. What is required is a solution which recognizes
the primacy of union self-government, and yet insures that self-government
will not undermine the very rights which the act was written to protect.
Because of the difficulty faced by courts in appreciating the subtleties of the
context of a member's conduct and the desirability of resolution of internal
disputes by the union itself, the question of bias within union judicial systems
merits close scrutiny. Of course, absolute impartiality can never be expected.
Decision-makers will always possess preferences for particular policies, such as
a predisposition in favor of internal order at the expense of free expression,
inquiry into the particular context of the conduct was required to determine whether
union discipline would be sustained. Union officers, the courts declared, must expect
criticism and other opposition through "traditionally democratic means," Madden v.
Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293-94, 174 N.Y.S.2d 663, 640-41, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1958). That
a member in the midst of a bitter political fracas transcends the bounds of veracity in
some relatively minor way will not justify his discipline, even though the unity of the
union be temporarily disrupted. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 16-17, 162 N.Y.S.2d
576, 590-92 (1957), and 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78
(1958). The court examined the total context of the alleged breach to determine whether
libel was being punished, which is proper, or criticism was being repressed, which is not.
Madden v. Atkins, 2 App. Div. 2d 1, 17, 162 N.Y.S2d 576, 591-92 (1957), aff'd as modified,
4 N.Y.S. 2d 283, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
Professor Summers has suggested that the New York courts in Madden were actually
articulating a course already long pursued silently, albeit clumsily, by them and by
other state courts. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,
70 YALE L.J. 175, 196 (1960). Professor Summers has also said elsewhere that section
101 (a) (2) of the Act ".... guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly, made articulate
the protection which a few courts had declared but many had in fact given." Summers,
American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. Rnv. 273, 282 (1962). Very
few state courts, though, have handled the necessary inquiries and balancing of factors as
well as did the courts in Madden; very few federal courts could be expected to do so in
the future.
38. Pervading the legislative history of the act are expressions of faith in the national
commitments to economic and social pluralism. This fundamental notion, that a free so-
ciety is secured by a flourishing of independent agencies each self-regulating within its
own area of competence, was understood in Congress to imply the minimization of official
intervention in the affairs of private organizations. These complementary policies are
emphasized at all stages of the legislative history of the act, usually in the form of "the
desirability of minimum intervention by government" and that "great care should be taken
not to undermine union self-government." See the Report of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare accompanying S. 1555, the basis for the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1959),
and 105 CONG. REc. 6476 (1959) (Remarks of Sert. McClellan).
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the natural preference of any arm of a socially militant organization. But more
serious is' result-oriented bias toward personalities: whether prejudice for or
against individual officers or members, or partiality for a particular regime or
opposition group, these attitudes pervade systems of union discipline, pre-
cluding the rendering of equal attention and regard to all the parties appearing
before them. Such bias is in many cases obvious, as where a member is tried
by the complaining officers whom he criticized,3 or by their relatives, 4° or by
an executive board appointed by such officers,41 or by other members who
owe appointments or other favors to them.4 2 Even when bias is less blatant,
it may be inherent in cases under section 101 (a) (2). Most discipline 'cases
litigated in the courts, especially those involving free speech, spring from
internal factional struggles which often encompass the entire active member-
ship. Any tribunal composed of union officials will probably be partial to the
officials' political allies ;43 a specially elected committee is just as likely to be
dominated by one faction or the other ;44 and a trial by the whole local tends
to be determined less on the merits of the case than on the strength of the
factions:4 Even selecting trial boards by drawing lots may not insure that
they are free from bias.40 Finally, appeals to international presidents and
39. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1945), appeal dismissed, 269 App.
Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945).
40. Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
41. Barry v. Frascona, 28 L.R.R.M. 2480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
42. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff'd as modified,
4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
43. In French v. Association of Master Painters (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961), the executive
committee of the District Council No. 9 did not sit as the trial board because of interest
in the case, which involved a dispute between the district council and a local. District
Council President Caputo also disqualified himself from appointing a substitute trial
board, as he was authorized to do under the council by-laws. Instead the delegates to the
district council elected the trial board from among their number, but the court recognized
that these officials were no less interested in the dispute than the officers themselves.
Moreover, the court noted that such a trial board, elected after the dispute had achieved
wide notoriety and discussion, could hardly be expected to possess the necessary dis-
interest.
44. In Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff'd as
modified, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.2d 633 (1958), three of the seven mem-
bers elected to the trial committee were paid employees of the union, owing their jobs to
the officers who had been criticized by the accused; a fourth judge had prosecuted charges
against a member of the same opposition faction for a similar activity. Doubts as to the
impartiality of the trial board were sufficient to discredit the disciplinary proceedings.
45. In Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (1945), the
accused had been charged with conduct unbecoming a union member for allegedly telling
the factory forewoman that the union was putting pressure on her to slow her work; it
was commonly known that the accused was resented by other union members for working
"too fast." The court, nonetheless, was unable to find any bias in her expulsion from the
union after a trial before the whole local. See also Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of
Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. RPE. REv. 15, 25 (1950).
46. Fitipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959) ; Harris v.
National Union of Marine Cooks, 98 Cal. App. 2d 733, 221 P.2d, 136 (1950).
196,41
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
councils, though generally permitted, cannot be expected to cure political in-
fections in trials below, as international officers are no more immune to fac-
tional politics than those of the locals.47
Bias so pervasive should give serious concern to those charged with imple-
menting the Bill of Rights for Union Members. Any system in which the
disciplinary process is invoked by those who in reality try the case is an
anathema to responsible self-government. 48 Without a truly independent union
judiciary experienced and concerned with procedural safeguards, it will be
difficult to attain that respect by the membership and the community for in-
ternal agencies and procedures which is indispensable for effective union self-
government. Such respect is vital within labor unions, where the disciplinary
process not only provides an opportunity for both catharsis by frustrated and
aggrieved members but also educates in the ways of democracy. In unions, the
function of imparting a sense of justice having been done may be as important
as that of imparting justice itself.49
However pervasive and contaminating partiality within union tribunals may
be, state courts faced with challenges to union disciplinary proceedings have
not adopted so comprehensive an analysis of the problem, but have sought
specific proof of partiality in each case. When obvious, they have discredited
partial tribunals and nullified the results of their proceedings.5 0 But courts
47. See Fish v. Huddell, 51 F2,d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1931); but contra Hall v. Morrin,
293 S.W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927), where a member was convicted of slandering international
officers by a tribunal consisting of the international president and another officer. The
court relied mechanically on the exhaustion of remedies rule even though the member's
internal appeal would have been to the international executive board, whom he had al-
legedly slandered.
48. The usual union disciplinary procedure is that a trial board-consisting either of
the union's executive board, members appointed by the president or elected by the local,
usually five to seven in number-hears the case after charges have been filed in writing
and timely notice given, to the accused to prepare to defend himself. Each side may occa-
sionally select counsel from among the membership, and each may present evidence and
sometimes cross-examine witnesses. The trial board reaches a verdict by majority vote
and reports to the next meeting of the local, which may accept, reject, or amend the
report by vote of varying numbers of required members, and then chooses the appropriate
penalty or relief. As a rule, either side may appeal from the local's decision to the inter-
national president, executive board, or convention. See Taft, Judicial Procedure in Labor
Unions, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 370, 381-84 (1945) ; Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,
4 InD. & L". REL. Rav. 15, 17 (1950).
49. See Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MICH.
L. Rxv. 55 (1959); STEIBER, OBERER & HARRINGTON, UNION DEMOcRAcY AND PUBLIC
REviEw (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960).
Injustice to an individual member is apt to undermine confidence on the part of
the other members as well as society at large, and tend to the destruction of the
organization....
Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 377, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on
other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933).
50. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1945), appeal dismissed, 269
App. Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945); Koukly v. Canavar, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y.
Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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have often found bias as elusive as judicial principles with which to detect it;
then they tend to be less candid. When courts have thought the imposition of
discipline by a union tribunal to have been politically motivated or simply
unfair, but have been unable to isolate proof of partiality, they have selectively
applied standards borrowed from criminal and administrative law to void the
proceedings.5 ' Such standards-timely notice, right to face and cross-examine
accusers, presumption of innocence-do provide some guidance in determining
the requisites of a fair hearing. But their selective application 52 has permitted
51. Most state courts attempted, somewhat erratically, to impose minimum procedural
requirements upon disciplinary proceedings. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline:
What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YAIE L.J. 175 (1960). In, the absence of statutory au-
thorization they justified their imposition on grounds of public policy, or "due process
of law." See Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Brick-
layers' Union v. Bower4 183 N.Y. Supp. 855, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; Sloan v. Braun, 20
Misc. 2d 204, 206, 191 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
In over two-thirds of the cases in which courts have granted relief to a disciplined
union member, some flaw in the union's trial procedure has been, cited as the reason for
invalidating the proceedings. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts
Do in Fact, 70 YAL.n L.J. 175, 200 (1960). Among the prerequisites for fair procedure,
the absence of which will cause most courts to nullify the discipline are: adequate and
timely notice, Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917) ; sufficient opportunity
to prepare defense, Walsh v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 22
NJ. Misc. 161, 37 A.2d 667 (Ch. 1944); full opportunity to present evidence, Cotton
Jammers' Ass'n v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900) ; full opportunity
to know evidence against him, Armant v. Cannon Employees Ass'n, 11 LAB. REL. REP.
752 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1942) ; presumption of innocence, Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S.2d
656 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; trial at time and place convenient to the accused, Fales v. Musicians'
Protective Union, 40 R.I. 34, 99 Atl. 823 (1917) ; freedom from double jeopardy. Reub
v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918).
52. Occasionally a court will admit its real rationale, Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283,
284, 205 N.Y. Supp. 6, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1924). Usually, though, courts are not so candid in
admitting that they protect the exercise of political rights by finding technical violations
of procedure with which to invalidate the disciplinary proceedings. Scivoletti v. Leclde,
148 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd as modified, 4 App. Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d
529 (1957); the same process is employed by finding hidden weaknesses of evidence,
Fitipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959), or Koukly v. Canavan,
154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935). "In short, the courts have not limited
their power to interpret procedural provisions. That power is not exercised according to
any abstract formula, but is used as a handy tool to protect individual members from
discipline which the courts feel is unfair, without just cause, or unduly severe." Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAv. L. REv. 1049, 1078-79 (1951). "[T]he
deviation tolerated depends largely on the judicial tolerance of the offense punished."
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175,
201 (1960).
Courts' interest in union members' political rights seems to disappear when these rights
become the vehicle of certain activities such as dual-unionism. In Margolis v. Burke, 53
N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct 1945), a local president who applied for a charter in a rival
union was summarily expelled without notice, and without a hearing. The court dis-
missed his objections, finding that the union acted in substantial compliance with the con-
stitutio% and that the plaintiff had "unclean hands." The courts have shown the same
lack of interest for the political and procedural rights of members disciplined for Com-
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the basic problem of biased tribunals to be avoided and obscured. Too often
courts have "felt" partiality and fixed upon some unimportant procedural slip-
up on which to pin the invalidation of the proceedings.5 3 As a result of relying
upon such inconsequential factors, courts have even occasionally ruled them-
selves into contradictory circles.54
Specific proof of bias should not, however, be required in each case. For
the disqualification of a tribunal for bias can be viewed as the obverse of the
presumption of impartiality which normally attends the oath of judicial office;
as such, it is too presumptive in nature. 5 To disqualify for bias, it should be
sufficient that some characteristic of the tribunal, such as the manner in which
it has been appointed, reveals a significant potential of partiality. Rather than
expressing disapproval of a particular tribunal, the decision to disqualify
should reflect the judgment that the circumstances present an unacceptable
likelihood that tribunals so constituted will be biasedY6 The realities of union
munist activities and associations. Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706
(Sup. Ct. 1947). The International Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper-
hangers of America, especially District Council No. 9 has been involved in several such
cases. Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 877, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ;
French v. Ladisky, 194 Misc. 549, 78 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 274 App. Div.
765, 80 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1948). In the latter case, a vociferous political leftist complained
that he had been denied due process at several points during the disciplinary proceedings
in which he was suspended from union activities for three years for allegedly having per-
mitted the use of spray guns. His suit was dismissed for failure to exhaust union remedies;
when he completed his internal appeals, to no avail, he filed again in the New York courts,
only to have his case dismissed; his first suit was held res judicata.
53. Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864, 869 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 855,
36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1942). See also note 52 supra.
54. The New York courts were trapped into such a contradiction in the cases of
Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935), reversing 152 Misc.
13, 272 N.Y. Supp. 624 (1934), aff'd as modified, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935), and
Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 800, 40
N.E.2d 1018 (1942). Faced in Shapiro with the complaint of an alleged slanderer of union
officers that his trial was not in compliance with the union constitution, the court dis-
regarded the fact that a constitutionally composed tribunal would have included the
slandered officers and nullified the discipline on the contract theory. A few years later
the same court held in Cohen v. Rosenberg, siupra that the proceedings of a trial board,
organized in exact compliance with the union constitution and thus consisting of officers
allegedly libeled by the plaintiff, were void on their face for bias.
55. For discussion of the applicability of these presumptions to statutorily constituted
boards regulating professions and trades, see the options in State Board v. Thrift-D-Lux
Cleaners, 40 Cal.2d 436, 245 P.2d 29 (1953) and in Blumenthal v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P. 2d 101 (1962).
56. The ramifications of disqualifying a union tribunal for partiality are quite different
from those of a state or federal court's disqualifying itself because of personal interest
in the result. Faced in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) with the question as to whether
a tax on the income of federal judges violates the constitutional protection of federal
judges' compensation from diminution, the Supreme Court refused to disqualify itself,
arguing that a serious question was before it and "there is no other appellate tribunal to
which under the law [the plaintiff] could go." Id. at 248. This doctrine of "necessity"-
that if the court whose impartiality is questioned is the only available tribunal to adjudicate
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discipline, especially the ordinary techniques for selection of trial and review
boards, would justify such a presumption in most union discipline cases in-
volving the political questions likely to arise under section 101 (a) (2).
While the conclusion of pervasive partiality within union tribunals rein-
forces the dilemma of no appropriate decision-maker as posed in Salhandler,
articulating the presumption of partiality may lead to a solution alternative to
that suggested by the Second Circuit. That alternative may exist in the court's
traditional competence and particular mandate under the act to guide unions
along paths of procedural rectitude. If the primary obstacle to distinctions
based upon the context of the conduct is that union tribunals are not suffi-
ciently disinterested to be trusted to distinguish between punishable and pro-
tected speech--or between free assembly and dual-unionism, or any other bal-
ance of individual and institutional rights-then the solution is not to eradicate
these necessary distinctions, but to insist that the unions provide tribunals
sufficiently disinterested.
Congress was unequivocal in its mandate to the federal courts in section
101 (a) (5) to guarantee that no union discipline would be recognized in the
absence of full and fair hearings. Because of the particular competency of
courts in establishing and applying standards of adjudicative procedure, that
assignment is completely appropriate. No agency is better suited to determine
the limits of timely notice of hearing, or of the counsel necessary, or of the
requirements of a written record. Identifying bias and insuring impartiality
of tribunals within private organizations, an essential component of a full and
fair hearing, may be a more complex problem than the adaptation of proce-
dural safeguards to be employed by such tribunals. But by the application of a
presumption of bias to ordinary union tribunals in cases involving political
questions, courts could place upon the union the burden of constructing a judi-
cial system which would insure that factional and other political pressures
were not reflected in its decisions. So long as discretionary handling of the
presumption leaves viable the possibility of a union's creating a workable and
impartial judicial system, this approach may provide a successful resolution
of the problem of no appropriate decision-maker suggested in Salzhandler.
Agencies would exist within labor organizations themselves capable of dis-
tinguishing between members' rights and the institution's basic welfare; and,
the impracticality of assigning the entire burden of such a process to the courts
would be obviated.
The salutary effects of the procedural approach would not be limited to the
litigants in a case in which that solution was applied. As an internal corrective,
issues which must be decided, that court must hear the case-has been echoed in state
courts, (as has been the usual holding-that the challenged income taxes on judges' salaries
are unconstitutional). Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45 (1946). See also Gordy v. Dennis,
176 Md. 106 (1938). No such problems of necessity for a decision or necessity for a
particular tribunal to make that decision arise in disqualifying a union tribunal for par-
tiality. If the union is determined to discipline a member, it can provide an alternative
judicial system which is free of the taint of personal bias, and thus should be required
to do so.
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it might remedy more basic union ills of which any particular instance of abuse
is but a symptom. By insisting upon full compliance with section 101 (a) (5)
before even passing on any of the substantive issues involved in Title I, courts
may be protecting the rights of members whose discipline they would never
have reviewed, and may be insuring that other dissenters are not prosecuted
at all. In fact, the entire range of rights guaranteed to members by Title I of
the Act might be vindicated by a vigorous enforcement of section 101 (a) (5).
An effective internal tribunal, while minimizing governmental intervention in
internal union affairs, can serve as a continuous and self-applying check upon
arbitrary executive conduct of the union's business.
Prescribing standards for disciplinary proceedings, including insistence upon
impartial hearings is, of all the potential solutions available under Title I, the
least encumbering of organized labor. Rather than forbidding unions the power
to discipline in certain vital areas in which that power was apparently reserved
to them, courts would require only that the disciplinary proceedings take a
certain form.57 Certainly such a solution would interfere less in the internal
ordering of unions than the imposition of substantive standards of the type
suggested by the resolution reached in Saizhandler. Indeed, the courts can
actually make more secure the unions' authority to protect themselves insti-
tutionally through discipline by candidly providing minimum procedural stand-
ards on which the unions can really rely. If the full protection of Title I is to
be guaranteed to members, and unions are still to be allowed to determine
when their basic institutional functions are jeopardized by a member's conduct,
then, as a New York court has stated, "[T]he tribunal ... [must not be]
subject to the slightest suspicion as to its fairness.... If there was a problem
as to how to provide an impartial appellate tribunal for these cases the burden
of its solution was [the union's]." 8
Such a burden is not intolerable: it is quite within the powers of unions to
develop a judiciary which can act with substantial impartiality in matters of
internal dispute. Absolute impartiality can never be obtained, and minor aber-
rations of impartiality could probably be avoided only by withdrawing from
unions the authority to establish their own disciplinary tribunals, by statutorily
creating a court for intra-union disputes, 9 or directing agents of the National
Labor Relations Board to hear such cases.60 Yet Congress chose otherwise:
seeking to vindicate both democracy in unions and pluralism in society, it
57. For an analysis of such a process, and its vindication of the individual's rights
with the least encumbrance upon government, in this case civil government, see, Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rlv. 533 (1951).
58. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 18, 19, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576, 593 (1957), aff'd
as modified, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
59. See Hardman, Legislating Union Democracy, The New Leader, Dec. 2, 1957,
pp. 3, 7.
60. Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TEXAs L. Rnv.
826, 836 (1954). Another proposal would extend civil courts' present authority of judicial
review to oversee more searchingly union disciplinary proceedings. Aaron & Komaroff,
Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-II, 44 ILL. L. REv. 631, 666-74 (1949).
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opted for union self-government and sought to make it responsible.6" By
recognizing and nourishing the development of a system of impartial internal
adjudication, courts can help insure the integrity of unions and encourage their
responsibility. The congressional choice suggests, rather than the attainment
of any absolute goal, an effort toward a relative improvement in internal
processes. Such an objective might be obtained even if only one of the tribu-
nals within the union's judicial hierarchy was assuredly impartial, so long as
its influence was felt throughout the union's judiciary. If the tribunal could be
shown to be independent-free from the ordinary pressures of factional and
personal interest-and if its decisions had substantial impact within and upon
the union's disciplinary system, a court might justifiably conclude that the
presumption of bias had been refuted.
Institutions are available which could satisfy such requirements. For in-
stance, arbitrators, whether as original adjudicators of the charges against
the member or as a reviewing body, could provide both the impartiality and
the competence required by the function. 62 A more interesting alternative was
found by the United Automobile Workers, who in 1957 created a Public
Review Board with jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the union's
ordinarily constituted trial boards. 63 Functioning as a "supreme court for the
union as to intra-union grievances," 64 and composed of seven "impartial per-
sons of good public repute," 65 the Board operates independently of political
pressures and yet within the normal process of the union's judicial system.66
61. See note 38 supra.
62. Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TEXAs L. Rv.
826, 836 ff. (1954) ; see also Tobias, A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Union Dis-
ciplinary Power, 9 LA. J.L. 925, 932 ff. (1958).
63. UAW, Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention, 97-108 (1957). A full report
on the first eighteen months of operation of the Board is published in the December 22,
1958 issue of the UAW newspaper, Solidarity, at 4-7. See also 39 L.R.R.M. 41 (1957),
and Business Week, July 12, 1958, at 81-88.
The Upholsterers' International Union had instituted a Public Review Board in 1953,
UIU General Laws, art. XXVI, § 6(b), but it has never been as effective as its UAW
counterpart. See 34 L.R.R.M. 65 (1954).
64. Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MIcH. L.
REv. 55, 57 (1959).
65. United Automobile Workers Constitution, art. XXXI, §§ 1 and 2. The members
of the Public Review Board are nominated by the international president of the union,
ratified by the international executive board, and elected by the biennial convention. The
seven members of the first Board suggest the standards of public morality which were
to be applied, as well as the seriousness of the experiment: Rabbi Morris Adler, Congre-
gation Shaarey Zadek, Detroit, Chairman; Magistrate J. A. Hanrahan, Essex County
Magistrate's Court, Windsor, Ontario; Monsignor George Riggins, National Catholic
Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C.; President Clark Kerr, University of California;
Judge Wade McCree, Wayne County Circuit Court, Detroit; Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam,
Methodist Church, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Edwin E. Witts, Professor Emeritus of Eco-
nomics, University of Wisconsin.
66. For kinds of standards that impartial tribunals can apply, see Aaron & Komaroff,
Statutory Requisition of Internal Union Affairs-II, 44 ILL. L. REv. 631 (1949); Note,
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Evaluations 67 of the impact of the UAW Public Review Board have em-
phasized the healthy restraint which the tribunal exercises upon the union
hierarchy. 68 Its existence has been conducive to more regular adherence to
the union's constitution and to re-examination of union rules and procedures
protecting internal due process.69 Officers have been more careful in dealing
with dissent, and dissenters have shown a greater willingness to accept the
judgments of the union judiciary.70 In short, the sense of responsible citizen-
ship within the union has been noticeably fostered by the inclusion of an im-
partial tribunal within the disciplinary system.7 1
Courts may be justifiably skeptical in evaluating ostensibly impartial union
tribunals. Unless judges are selected from outside the union's membership, it
seems highly unlikely that the requisite independence will be possessed. Even
where such selections are made, impartiality may prove a sham. Principles of
selection which emphasize the community standing of the persons chosen and
their non-involvement, directly or indirectly, in union politics should be
favored; so should fixed terms, financial independence, and other characteris-
tics traditionally associated with an independent bench.72 Moreover, there may
Public Review Boards: A Check on Union Disciplinary Power, 11 STAN. L. REv. 497
(1959); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. RFv. 609
(1959).
67. See Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MIfcs.
L. REv. 55 (1959); STEIBER, OBER & HARRINGTON, UNION DEmocRAcY AND PUBLIC
REvIEw (Center- for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960) ; Givens, Federal Pro-
tection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FouRHA L. REv. 259, 293-301
(1960) ; Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YALE L. 1327, 1349-51 (1958) ; Note, Public Review Boards:
A Check on Union Disciplinary Power, 11 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1959).
68. For example, the UAW appeal boards, consisting of international officers, have
been more demanding upon local tribunals, affirming only one-third as many decisions in
the period immediately following the establishment of the Public Review Board as in the
period immediately before. See Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some
Reflections, 58 MICH. L. REv. 55, 81 (1959).
69. Ibid.
70. See STEIBER, OBzRER & HARRINGTON, UxoN DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REVrmw
(Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960).
71. See Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 55 (1959). Archibald Cox has even proposed a procedure in which the Secretary
of Labor would be authorized
... to issue periodic certificates exempting a union from governmental enforcement
proceedings instituted by the NLRB upon a finding that the union had established
an independent appeal board under the auspices of which a union member... would
receive at least as great protection as he would before the NLRB or in a suit by
the Secretary.
Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HAgv. L. R~v. 609, 623
(1959). "This procedure would," Cox argued, "bring the cases much closer to the people
affected. It would preserve a larger measure of informality, flexibility, and self-govern-
ment. It would minimize government interference in internal union affairs.' Ibid.
72. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LABOR UNION "BILL OF RIGHTS,"
DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONs, THE KENwFDY-IvEs BILI-STATEMENTS BY THE ACLU
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be reasons to inquire carefully into the effectiveness of one impartial body
operating within a system of union discipline in which the other bodies are
politically selected. The potential for impotence always exists in an umpire,
whether arbitrator, public review board, or any other third party, employed
by a powerful organization to adjudicate conflicts between it and a powerless
member. On the one hand, an independent agency could succumb to forceful
pressure; on the other, its results may be ignored in the massive inertia of a
union traveling a familiar course. A court should determine the willingness of
an impartial review board to reverse the decisions of lower tribunals and the
impact of such reversals upon adjudicators, as well as the effect and respect
given an independent adjudicator's decisions throughout an otherwise ordi-
narily constituted system.
To implement this suggestion for handling cases of controverted union dis-
cipline, courts should stress as a prior question whether the complaining union
member had been given a full and fair hearing. An important part of that in-
quiry must be directed to the impartiality of the union's tribunals. Ordinarily
the presumption of bias could be applied, subject to rebuttal, to determine
whether an impartial hearing had been given the member. That an aggrieved
member's case was adjudicated or reviewed by an independent and effective
judicial body, whether arbitrator, public review board, or other similar agency
should constitute a proper refutation of the presumption. Care must be taken
not to encumber the flexibility of section 101 (a) (5) with unnecessary rigidity.
Despite the presumption, a union should be permitted to prove that its insti-
tutional solution to the problem of an independent judiciary is as valid as
arbitration or public review. Experimentation should be encouraged: a wide
variety of acceptable agencies might be produced. Likewise a member should
be allowed to prove that a tribunal, although so constituted as to seem im-
25 (1958). The American Civil Liberties Union has proposed, as a part of a general pro-
grain to insure independent tribunals for intra-union disputes, that the judgment of an
impartial review board be made enforceable in civil courts. Ibid. at 6-7. Some authorities,
who advocate legislation, empowering a supervisory federal agency to review intra-union
grievances, have suggested that a strong presumption of validity or even finality be
accorded by such an agency to decisions of voluntarily adopted impartial review boards
which must meet certain standards. Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some
Reflections, 58 MicH. L. REv. 55, 84-85 (1959). In that way the voluntary system could
be protected against its inherent weakness by freeing impartial tribunals from exclusive
dependence upon the good-will of union leadership. See Levitan, Government Regulation
of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Right of Members, Report to House Committee
on Education and Labor, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (Comm. Print, 1958). Under plans
of this sort, impartial review boards, such as those of the UAW and UIU, would effec-
tively operate as a substitute for official administrative review. This was essentially the
plan for regulating union trusteeships contained in the original bill presented by Senator
Kennedy before the 85th Congress: S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2044 (1958), but
eliminated in the Kennedy-Ives version: S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(a), (b)
(1958). The scheme is also similar to § 10(k) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947, which provides that the NLRB will not have jurisdiction to hear complaints on
jurisdictional disputes if the parties submit their controversy to private settlement. 61
Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
partial, in fact was biased. Furthermore, courts should not allow the impar-
tiality of some intervening body to protect all errors in previous proceedings.
The member ought to be permitted to show that in spite of the existence of
an impartial body within the union's disciplinary system, he was nonetheless
subjected to another tribunal which was particularly biased, or that at some
point in the chain of proceedings he was denied one of the other essential
elements of a full and fair hearing-that he was denied sufficient notice, or
time adequately to prepare his case, or proper counsel. The experience and
special competence of courts in this area should be applied in the adaptation
of judicial standards to the context of labor organizations.
If the proceedings are found wanting, the discipline should then be invali-
dated without prejudice to the union's charges against the member. Other-
wise, the requirements of section 101(a) (5) having been satisfied, a court
may proceed to an inquiry as to whether the union rule under which the mem-
ber was prosecuted is prohibited substantively by any section of the act, with-
out the need for a trial de novo. Only the particularly judicial functions of
prescribing procedural standards, statutory interpretation, and judicial review
are necessary. While courts will not be completely freed from all responsibility
for developing and applying substantive standards for reasonable disciplinary
rules under the act, the greater part of this burden can be delegated to more
competent decision-makers subject to the court's own review. Thus by insuring
an independent judiciary for internal union disputes, courts can simultaneously
enforce the mandate of Congress under section 101(a) (5) and protect both
the unions' institutional integrity and the members' political rights as required
under section 101 (a) (2) without exceeding the proper limits of judicial par-
ticipation in the process.
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